



HAN V. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, 75 N. E. 33 (IND.).-A statute required that the
board of public works of a city let contracts for street improvements to the
lowest and best bidder. Held, that the board had no power to specify that
street should be paved with a patented pavement, though the owner of the
patent agreed to furnish the materials at a fixed price to any contractor
equipped to lay the same. Wiley, C. J., and Myers, P. J., dissenting.
Upon this question the authorities seem to be in irreconcilable conflict. It
has been held in several states that where there was such a statute the city did
not have the power to let contracts requiring patented materials controlled by
one man; Burgess v. City offefTerson, 21 La. Ann. 143; for it would destroy
competition and create a monopoly. Dean v. Charlsto, 23 Wisc. 59o. But in
others, and, it seems, with the better reason, the city may contract for a cer-
tain kind of asphalt pavement, although the patent of the material is owned
by one person. Verdin v. City of St. Louis, 131 MO. 26. It may contract for
such things as are deemed for the best interest of the city, although the mate-
rial contracted for is the product of an exclusive manufacturer. City of New-
ark v. Bonnell, 57 N. J. L. 424. Otherwise, however necessary to the public
welfare, the contract could not be made if the article desired or the manner of
performance of the contract required a patented article; Barber As61a lt Pav.
Co. v. Hunt, 100 MO. 24; and thus the best interest of the city could not be
subserved. Baird v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 567.
CONTRACTS-IMPLIED CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEY'S SERVICE.-DAvIs v. TRIM-
BLE, 88 S. W. 920 (ARK.).-Held, that a contract for professional services can-
not be implied between a party indirectly interested in the proceedings and an
attorney, where the services were for the benefit of the party, and he, know-
ing, accepts them. Hill, C. J., Wood, J., dissenting.
A contract to pay for legal services may be implied or negatived according
to the circumstances. Mathews v. Lincoln County Commissioners, go Minn.
348. A client, knowing the attorney is rendering services and who does not
dissent, is liable on an implied contract for fees. Davis v. Walker, 131 Ala.
204; Coofier v. Hamilton, 52 Ill. i19 . Mere incidental benefits derived from
professional services are not sufficient basis for an implied contract to pay for
such services. Lamar v. Hall and Wimberly, 129 Fed. 79; Roselius v. Dela-
chaise, 5 La. Ann. 481. If the party avails himself of the professional services
in the ordinary mode in which clients avail themselves of such services and
nothing more appears, a promise to pay for such services is implied. Ames
v. Potter, 7 R. I. 265.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY OF INNKEEPER.-CLANCY V. BARKER, 103
N. W. 446 (NEE.).-Held, that it is the duty of an innkeeper to protect his
guests, while in his hotel, from the assaults of employds. Barnes J., dis-
senting.
Since the dictum uttered in Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 32, denying the
liability of the innkeeper for assaults on guests by servants little attention
seems to have been given the subject. According to the tenor of moderm
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authority the liability of the innkeeper is similar to that of an ordinary master.
Wade v. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578. Recently there have been some intimations
that the rule of liability of common carriers should be applied to innkeepers.
Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579.
PLEDGES-WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS-DELIVERY.-UNION TRUST CO. V. WIL-
SON, 25 SUP. CT. 766.-Held, that goods which are stored, "to be delivered
only on surrender of this receipt," are delivered sufficiently by a transfer of the
receipt, as against creditors. Harlan, Brewer, and Day, JJ., dissenting.
Generally, there must be actual transfer of the property to be good against
creditors. Christian v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 133 U. S. 241; Sktf v. Stod-
dard, 63 Conn. ig8. No matter how numerous the articles are no writing can
be a substitute for a pledge. George v'. Pierce, 123 Cal. 172. But in certain
cases, as in that of warehouse receipts, where delivery of the goods is imprac-
ticable, it has been held sufficient to deliver the receipt. Willits v. Hatch,
132 N. Y. 41. There have been cases to the contrary. Nat'l Exch. Bank V.
Graniteville Mfg. Co., 79 Pa. 22. But the great weight of authority is as in
the principal case. Bank v. Hubbard, 48 Mich. 118; Union Trust Co. v.
Trumbull, 137 Ill. 146.
MASTER AND SERVANT-NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE-AssuMPTION OF
RISKs.-HALL V. WEST SLADE MILL CO., 8I PAC. 915 (WAsH.).-Held, that a
master who fails to comply 'with a statute requiring him to place safeguards
over cogs, gearing, and the like, cannot invoke the doctrine of "assumed
risk" against a servant who is injured bysuch unguarded machinery, although
the latter knows of the failure to comply with the requirements, and the dan-
ger to which he is subjected. Root, Rudkin, and Crow, JJ., dissenting.
On this question the authorities are by no means uniform. It is well set-
fled that at common law a servant cannot recover damages when he knows of
the dangers incident to his employment; St. Louis, I. M. &- S. Ry. Co. '.
Davis, 54 Ark. 389; for he is presumed to have assumed the risks and cannot
recover, though the master is negligent, Mundle v. Hill Mfg. Co., 86 Me.
400. Some states hold that statutes similar to the above one change the com-
mon law in this respect and say that failure, by the master, to comply with
the requirements renders him liable, even though the servant knows of the
dangers; Brazil Coal Co. v. Hoodlet, 129 Ind. 327; nor does the right of the
servant to recover depend upon his exercising ordinary care. Catlett v.
Young, 143 Ill. 74. Other states, and, it seems, by the weight of authority,
say that these statutes are penal and do not in any way affect the right of the
servant to recover; Knisby r'. Pratt, X48 N. Y. 372, and that the servant can-
not recover for an injury resulting from an open and obvious defect caused by
the master's failure to perform a statutory duty. Stiva v. Osage Coal Min.
Co., 88 Mo. 68.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-JURISDICTION OF COURTS-BNACUM V. MURPHY, 140
N. W. 180 (NEB.).-Held, that the courts will not review the process or pro-
ceedings of church tribunals for the purpose of deciding whether they are
regular or within their ecclesiastical jurisdiction; nor will they attempt to de-
cide upon the membership or spiritual status of persons belonging or claiming
to belong to religious societies.
The decisions of the highest tribunal of a church on a purely ecclesiastical
matter are binding upon the civil courts. Kims v. Robertson, 154 Ill. 394;
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Connit v. Church, 54 N. Y. 551. But although civil courts have no power to
rejudge the rulings ofecclesiastical tribunals as to matters within their juris-
diction, it has been held that the jurisdiction may be inquired into. Perry v.
Wheeler, 75 Ky. 541; Samsell v. Escher, xx Ohio Dec. 35I. Still, in order for
a civil court to have jurisdiction, it must obtain it because some civil or prop-
erty rights have been violated. Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. z98; Birdv.
Church, 62 Iowa 567. Thus a deposed minister, simply as such, has no civil
redress, even though he lose reputation and means of livelihood because of the
deposition. Watson v. Garvin, 54 MO. 353. Cases as apparently in conflict
as Chase v. Cheney, 58 111. 5o9, and Kreiker v. Shirley, 163 Pa. 534, the first
of which holds that the civil courts will not interfere with religious associa-
tions to revise their decision upon ecclesiastical matters, or for the purpose of
ascertaining their jurisdiction, and the second of which holds that the laws of
an ecclesiastical body will be reorganized and enforced by the civil courts, if
not in conflict with the constitution or laws of the state, are reconcilable, if it
is considered that the civil courts take jurisdiction only when civil or property
rights are violated, ante, and that the proceedings of religious associations
should receive.the same consideration as those of any other voluntary associa-
tion. Smith v. Nelson, i8 Vt. 5x1. See xiv Yale Lawfournal, 398.
PRINCIPAI. AND AGENT-AUTHORITY OF AGENT-ADfISSIBILITY OF EVL
DENC.-QUALE V. HAZEL, xo4 N. W. 215 (S. D.).-Held, that where a plaintiff
in an action for commission for the sale of land for the defendant, alleged
that the contract sued on was made with the defendant's agent, whose authro
ity to contract with the plaintiff the defendant denied, the contractbetween
the defendant and his agent, which the defendant testified was the only con-
tract that he had made regarding the sale of the land, was admissible.
Where the nature and extent of the agency is contested, a letter from the
principal to the agent bearing upon the scope of his authority is admissible
Slonecker v. Garrett, 48 Pa. 415; Bell v. .Rankin, I Kan. App. 2o9. Any
paper of this nature that is shown by the agent to the adverse party, even
although not used in the transaction between them, is admissible to show the
limitations upon the agent's authority. Deane v. Everett, 90 Iowa 242; Her-
ring v. Skaggs, 62 Ala. I8o. The fact that it is not written to the adverse
party does not prevent its admission as evidence. Morse v. Diebold, 2 MO.
App. 163. So a power of attorney to sell real estate may be concerned in a
letter or any other kind of a private writing. Wheelage v. Lotz, 44 La. Ann.
6oo. By any of the above means, it is competent for a principal appointing a
special agent to show what his instructions to such agent were, in order to
prove the extent of the agent's authority. Nininger v. Knox, 8 Minn. 14o.
DIVORCE-EVIDENCE OF CO-RESPONDENT.-DELANEY v. DELANEY, 6I AmT.
226 (N. J.).-Held, that the uncorroborated evidence of a co-respondent is
sufficient evidence on which to grant a divorce.
Generally it has not been so held, although it has been said to be rather a
precaution of the courts than a rule of law. Evans v. Evans, 93 Ky. 512;
Mollter v. Moller, x5 N. Y. 466. The reason is that the paramour shows, by
his very statement, his character to be such that a serious matter, like a de-
cree of divorce, should not be allowed on his unsupported testimony. Some
cases, however, follow the law of the principal case in declaring that it is suf-
ficient where it is the only evidence or where the evidence is of equal weight-
Mayer v. Mayer, 21 N. J. Eq. 286; Herrick v. Herrick, 31 Mich. 298.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITIES-CONTRACT UNDER SEAL.-VAN
DYKE v. VAN DYKE, X7 S. E. 582 (GA.).-Held, that the rule that an undis-
closed principal shall stand liable for the contract of his agent does not apply
when the contract is a promissory note under seal.
It is a settled rule of law that no one but a party to a sealed instrument
can be sued thereon. Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 347. But there is con-
flict as to whether the sealed instrument can be disregarded and suit be
brought against the undisclosed principal on an implied contract, in cases
where the seal is not necessary as above. It was held, in Boerscherling v,.
Kotz, 37 N, J. Eq, i5o, that it could not ; but the best considered cases hold
otherwise: Moore v. Granby Min. Co., 8o Mo. 86; Hitchcox v. Mloore, 4 Wend.
285 ; and there seems to be no reason why the mere fact that an instrument is
under seal, though it is not necessary as in the above case, should change the
liability of the principal. Ktrshbor v. Bauzel, 67 Wis. 178.
RAILROAD-CROSSING ACCIDENTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-YEATON
v. BOSTON & M. R, R. 61 ATL. 522 (N. H.).-Held, tiat, where plaintiff is
killed by attempting to cross in front of a train, his contributory negligence is
immaterial if the company's servants, by the exerbise 'of care, could have
avoided the accident.
As a rule negligence which contributed to the injury will prevent a rm
covery. Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Dewey, 25 111 255; Young v. Old Colony R."
Co., r56 Mass. 178, If defendant's acts are gross or willful contributory negli-
gence is immaterial. Kans. Pac. R. Co. V. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37. The present
case is an illustration of the stricter rule that is applied to railroad crossings.
In case of negligence in failure to use signals, etc., the plaintiff's contributory
negligence will prevent a recovery. Ga. Pac. R. Co., tr. Lee, 92 Ala. 262;
State v. Me. Cen. R. Co.. 77 Me. 538. While a similar amopnt of negligence
in not using due care on seeing a person approaching a crossing will render
plantiff's contributory negligence immaterial. Kean v. Ball. &- 0. R. Co., 6z
Md. 154; Maryland Cent. R. Co. v. Newheur, 62 Md. 391.
TORTS-CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS.-ILL. CENT. R. R. Co. v. BucHANAN,
88 S. W. 312 (Ky.).-Held, that where a railroad hospital association was incor-
porated and supported by monthly assessments deducted by the railroad from
the employ6s' salaries the railroad was not liable for the negligence of physi-
cians of the hospital in treating a railroad employd. Hobson, C. J., Munn, J.,
dissenting.
The rule is that those who furnish hospital accommodations and medical
attendance, not to make profit thereby, but out of charity are not liable for
the malpractice of the physicians or the negligence of the attendants they
employ, but are responsible only for their own want of ordinary care in select-
ing them. Glavin v. R. L Hosfiital, 12 R. I. 41r3; Secord v. St. Paul M. &-
M. R. R. Co., z8 Fed. 221. The company has performed its whole duty when
it has selected a proper and competent man. Van Tassell v. Manhattan
Eye & Ear Hos4ital, 15 N. Y. Sapp. 620; McDonald v. Mfass. Gen. Hosfi.,
120 Mass. 432. But if the company conducts the hospital to derive profit
thereby, it would be liable for the want of skill of its physicians. x Shearm
&.Redf. Neg. See. 331.
TRUSTS-SAVINGS BANK DzPoSIT.-NICHoLAs V. PAREZ, 6I ATr. 267
(N. J.).-H ld, that a savings bank deposit made by intestate In her own name
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as trustee for another, she retaining complete control during her life, was in-
sufficient to create a trust.
The intention to or not to create a trust is the controlling element. Kelley
v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288. Many courts hold that the mere deposit in trust for
another without more raises an inference of a trust. Gafney's Estate, 146 Pa,
St. 49; Robertson v. McCarty, 54 N. Y. App. Div. re3. Others hold that
some further act is necessary to evidence intent. Cleveland v. Htam den
Say. Bank, 182 Mass. 1io; Marcy v. Amazeen, 6i N. H. x31. Some jurisdic-
tions go farther and hold that it may be a trust, even though the donor intends
to retain control over it till his death. Martn v. Martin, i66 N. Y. 6xi;
Miller v. Clark, 4o Fed. IS. But the general rule is that the reservation of
the power of revocation negatives the intention to create a trust. Providence
Say. Inst. v. Carfienter, 18 R. I. 287.
WILLS-UNDUE INFLUENcE-BRADFORD V. BLOSSOM, 88 S. W. 721 (MO.).-
Held, that undue influence may be inferred from facts and circumstances-
from the relation of the parties and testator's mental condition. Brace, C. J.,
Marshall, J., dissenting.
The widest range of evidence is permitted to show undue influence. Rey.
nolds v. Adams, 9o Ill. '34; Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459. That influ-
ence is not presumed to be undue which is acquired by affection, honest
argument or persuasion, Re Snelling, 136 N. Y. 515, close relationship, charge
and control of decedent's business affairs, presence of chief beneficiary when
will was executed, Machall v. Machall, 135 U. S. x67, unless testator's free
agency is destroyed. Schmidt v..Schmidt, 20 Ill. igi. To invalidate the will,
undue influence must be intentionally exercised specifically to secure the tes-
tament in question. H-erster v. Herster, 116 Pa. 612. Unless the testator's
mental capacity at the time of the execution of the will is questioned neither
his prior nor subsequent declarations are competent evidence. In re Dono-
van's Estate, 14o Cal. 390.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LANDLORD'S LIEN-PossEssioN OF CRoPS.-GRozs-
33ECK V. EVANS, 88 S. W. 889. A creditor of a tenant attempted by execution
to remove the tenant's crop from the premises of the landlord and it was
held, that the landlord, by virtue of his lien, has such possessory rights in the
crop of his tenant as to prevent its removal from the premises, and if re-
moved, to maintain an action as to the right of property, in order to have the
crop returned.
A landlord's lien for rent is paramount to the lien of an execution creditor;
Travers v. Cook, 42 Ill App. 580; or to a prior judgment. Reddick v. Hutch-
rosOn, 94 Ga. 675. There is a cause of action against the creditor of the lessee
to the extent of the lessor's lien. Ward v. Gibbs, io Tex. Civ. App. 287
Where a tenant's mortgagee converts the crop the landlord can maintain
special action on the case for his lien for rent. Hudson v. Vaughan's Eirs,
57 Ala. 6og; Sh.elbhrd v. Taylor, IO5 Ala. 507. Injunction is a proper
remedy to enforce a landlord's lien upon property found upon the rented
premises, as against execution creditors endeavoring to sell it to satisfy their
debts. Click v, Stewart, 36 Tex. 28o. A tenant may dispose of crops with-
out consent of the landlord. Dorimus v. Howard, 23 N. J. L. 390.
HOMICmg--COOLING Tnm.-FRANKs v. STATE, 88 S. W. 923 (TEx.).-Held,
that cooling time was a question of time in which the mind of an ordinary
RECERT CASES 43
man might regain his reason and become sedate, and not one of the actual con.
dition of the mind at the time of the homicide. Brooks, J., dissenting.
It has been held that cooling time was a question of fact as to the actual
condition of the man's mind at the time of committing the homicide. Jones v.
State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 492. But by the great weight of authority there seems
to be no hard and fast rule. State v. Hill, 4 Dev. & Bal. Law 396. It is a
question of time to be determined upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case; State v. Yarbrough, 39 Kan. 58I; generally the time in
which an ordinary man would have cooled is regarded as a reasonable time;
Kil~atrick v. Com., 31 Pa. 198; and if this time has elapsed, which is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury, the crime is not reduced to manslaughter, even
though it is clear that the rage did actually continue and cause him to strike
the fatal blow. McNeill v. State, 102 Ala. 121,
CORPORATIONS-STOCK DIVIDENDS-INCOME OR PRINCIPAL.r-SAE DEPOSIT
AND TRUST Co. V. WHITE, 6I ATL. 29 (MD.).-Held, that a dividend in stocks
of a corporation declared out of the net earnings, is income and not principal.
Such has been the rule in some jurisdictions. MfcLouth v. Hunt, r54
N. Y. 179; Ashurst v. Rields Adm'rs, 26 N. J. Eq. I. The reason Is that
being income it makes no difference what form it assumes. In re Smith, 140
Pa. St. 344. On the other hand, by what would seem to be the better reason-
ing, it is held, contrary to the rule in the principal case, that shares of stock
represent an interest in the capital and management of the corporation and
hence, should be considered principal. Davis V. Jackson, r52 Mass. 58-
Gibbons v. Maon, z56 U. S. 549.
CONVRSION-MEASURE oFr DAuAGES.-BARK R V. ST. Louis STORAGE AND
TRANSFER Co. 6I ATL. 363 (CONN.).-Held, that the measure of damages for
the conversion of household goods, is not the market value, but the value to
the owner based on his actual loss.
The general rule in the law of damages is that the market price is to be
taken as the value. Parinenter v,. Fitzpatrick, X35 N. Y. I9o. And such
has been held to be the case even where the goods are of special value to the
owner. Iler v. Baker, 82 Mich. 226; Beebe v, Wilkinson, 30 Minn. 548.
But, as the law aims to put a man in as good position as he would have been
in had the loss not occurred, the true measure of damages would seem to be,
as in the principal case, the actual value to the owner. Sickney v. Alles,
76 Mass. 35s; Lovel. Shea, 18 N. Y. Supp. 193.
